

PRC foreign policy during the reign of Jiang Zemin (1989-2003): "three ghosts of fear" as the basis for establishing intra-elite consensus in foreign policy

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ՉԺՀ արտաքին քաղաքականությունը Ցզյան Չեմինի օրոք (1989-2003). «Վախի երեք ուրվականները» որպես ներելիտար կոնսենսուսի հաստատման հիմք արտաքին քաղաքականության ոլորտում

Բարդակչյան Հովհաննես Խ.

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Ամփոփագիր. Հոդվածում քննարկվում է Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության արտաքին քաղաքականությունը նախագահ Ցզյան Չեմինի օրոք: Ուսումնասիրվել է Չինաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության ապագադափարականացման և պրագմատիզացիայի միտումը: Բացահայտվում են դրա պատճառներն ու արդյունքները, օրինակ՝ ՉԺՀ-ի հեղինակության վերականգնումը Տյանանմեն հրապարակում տեղի ունեցած իրադարձություններից հետո: Բացի այդ, ուսումնասիրվել է Ցզյան Չեմինի օրոք Չինաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության գարգացման համար պատասխանատու առաջատար քաղաքական գործիչների հարաբերությունները: Պարզվել է, որ ուսումնասիրվող ժամանակաշրջանի մի շարք առաջատար քաղաքական գործիչներ անցել են նման կայացման ուղի, ինչը իր հերթին ազդել է նրանց վարած տնտեսական և արտաքին քաղաքականության վրա: Ցզյան Չեմինի օրոք ՉԺՀ-ի կարևոր ձեռքբերումը ՉԺՀ-ում շուկայական տնտեսության վերջնական հաստատումն է և համաշխարհային ֆինանսատնտեսական համակարգի հետ ինտեգրումը: Այս ձեռքբերումը հնարավոր է դարձել Չինաստանի կառավարության ֆինանսատնտեսական բյուրոյի ջանքերով, որը գլխավորում էր Չժու Ռոնցին: Այս գործընթացը իր զագաթնակետին հասավ 2001 թվականին Առևտրի համաշխարհային կազմակերպությանը Չինաստանի անդամակցությամբ: Բացի այդ, հենց ուսումնասիրվող ժամանակահատվածում չինական դիվանագիտությունը սկսեց ակտիվորեն օգտագործել տնտեսական ազդեցության գործիքները: Արդեն Հու Ցզինտայի և Սի Ցզինպինի կառավարման տարիներին սա կղառնա չինական դիվանագիտության բնորոշ նշան: Ներկայացված տվյալների հիման վրա ենթադրություն է արվել ՉԺՀ առաջատար քաղաքական գործիչների միջև ոչ պաշտոնական ներելիտար համաձայնության մասին: Ըստ այդ համաձայնության, ոչ մի ներկուսակցական և ներքաղաքական հակամարտություն չպետք է արտագոյվի արտաքին քաղաքականության վրա, որպեսզի չդառնա ՉԺՀ-ի թուլացման պատճառ: Այս համաձայնության պատճառը Շթեյն Ռինգենի կողմից բացահայտված «վախի երեք ուրվականներն են», որոնք իրականության ընկալման որոշիչ գործոններ են ոչ միայն Չինաստանի բնակիչների, այլև ՉԺՀ-ի էլիտաների համար:

Հանգուցարաններ՝ ՉԺՀ, Չինաստան, արտաքին, հարաբերություններ, Ցզյան Չեմին, քաղաքականություն, պետություն, նախագահ, միջազգային, Շանհայ

Внешняя политика КНР во время правления Цзян Цзэминя (1989-2003): «три призрака страха» как основа установления внутриэлитарного консенсуса во внешней политике

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Аннотация: В статье изучается внешняя политика Китайской Народной Республики в годы правления председателя Цзян Цзэминя. Изучен тренд на деидеологизацию и прагматизацию внешней политики Китайской Народной Республики. Выявлены ее причины и результаты, такие как восстановление авторитета КНР после Событий на площади Тяньаньмэнь. Были изучены взаимоотношения ведущих политических деятелей отвечавших за выработку внешней политики КНР в период правления Цзян Цзэминя. Выяснено, что ряд ведущих политиков изучаемого периода прошли похожий путь становления, что в свою очередь, влияло на проводимую ими как экономическую, так и международную политику. Важным достижением КНР периода правления Цзян Цзэминя является окончательное утверждение в КНР рыночной экономики и интеграция с мировой финансово-экономической системой, достигнутой благодаря усилиям финансово-экономического

блока китайского правительства, возглавляемого Чжу Жунцзи. Кульминацией этого стало вступление КНР во Всемирную Торговую Организацию в 2001 году. Кроме того, именно в изучаемый период китайская дипломатия начала активно применять экономические инструменты влияния. Уже в годы правления Ху Цзиньтао и Си Цзиньпина это станет визитной карточкой китайской дипломатии. На основе предоставленных данных выдвинуто предположение о негласном внутриэлитарном консенсусе между ведущими политиками КНР. Консенсус состоит в том, что любой внутренний конфликт ни при каких обстоятельствах не должен был отражаться на глобальной внешней политике или становиться причиной ослабления КНР. Причина этого кроется в выявленных Штеинем Рингеном «трех призраках страха», которые являются определяющими факторами в восприятии реальности не только жителями Китая, но и элитами КНР.

Ключевые слова: КНР, Китай, внешняя, отношения, Цзян Цзэминь, политика, государство, президент, международная, Шанхай

Jiang Zemin's reign covers a long period - fourteen years. The highest officials of the PRC during the reign of Jiang Zemin in the official Chinese historiography were collectively called the Third Generation of Chinese leaders, by analogy with the second generation associated with Deng Xiaoping and the first generation of Mao Zedong.

However, against the background of the former rulers of the PRC, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin's personality seems somewhat faded. Chairman Jiang's reign was not marked by epochal changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the country. He did not offer a radically new ideology like Mao or did not change the economic structure like Deng Xiaoping. But it is difficult to overestimate the time of Chairman Jiang's rule precisely from the point of view of consolidating all the results that China has achieved over the previous decades.

Jiang Zemin's coming to power was due to objective circumstances that prompted Deng Xiaoping and his supporters to look for a highly competent transitional figure who could lead the country in the conditions of the political crisis that arose due to the riots in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

Jiang Zemin, whose political influence in Beijing was limited, turned out to be a suitable candidate for the "temporary worker" [6]. It was because Jiang Zemin quite gently solved the problem of protests in Shanghai when he was the head of the city. In addition, party leaders also took into account the fact that during Jiang's tenure as a mayor, Shanghai changed a lot and began to turn into a modern showcase of China, clearly showing all the changes that have taken place in the country [5, p. 36].

At that time China's foreign policy had already undergone a serious transformation [3, p. 104]. For example, the goals of Chinese strategy in international relations under Mao Zedong can be characterized as follows:

- 1) Ensuring national security.
- 2) Guaranteeing the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.
- 3) Raising the international status of China

After the death of Mao Zedong and the victory of the group of pragmatists within the CCP over the far-left Maoists, the foreign policy of China began to change. The second generation of Chinese leaders who came to power, led by Deng Xiaoping, saw different goals in the country's foreign policy, namely [3, p. 104]:

- 1) Maintain a peaceful international environment to carry out the "four modernizations".

- 2) Contribute to the establishment of a new international political and economic order.

An important feature of the foreign policy of the PRC before Jiang Zemin is its high reliance on ideology. The roots of this were in the Communist Party ideology. The Party, first of all, should pursue the proletariat's interests in its foreign policy, not the national interests. During the Mao reign, "national interest" was a rarely seen concept in Chinese diplomacy. For example, among the 173 writings, speeches, talks, comments and telegrams on China's diplomacy included in the "Selected Works of Mao on diplomacy" (1994) and in the "Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy" (1990), we have not the term "national interest". Between 1949 and 1992 the term only appeared twice in the CCP mouthpiece People's Daily and was never mentioned by Chinese leaders [11, p. 460].

In addition, an active internal political discussion led to the fact that, following economic liberalization, active sections of Chinese society began to expect political liberalization. Moreover, similar expectations existed in the expert community of Western democracies. The incident in Tiananmen Square has become a sobering factor for both internal opposition and external players.

In such conditions, Chairman Jiang faced a very non-trivial task: not only to strengthen his power but also to lead the country out of the international isolation in which it found itself after the above-mentioned events. The most important trend during the reign of Jiang Zemin in foreign policy was its de-ideologization and pragmatization. There are several reasons for this. For example, there was no authoritative leader in the Chinese political space who could dictate the country's foreign policy with his willpower. In addition, there

was an expansion and complication of the sphere of international relations, and their content became more professional, because of which the process of complicating the bureaucratic system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC began [11, pp. 460-461].

This led to the fact that in the conditions of the end of the Cold War reliance on ideology turned into a counterproductive method. In addition, it is worth considering the personal factor of leading politicians when studying the country's foreign policy. So the most important role in the normalization of relations between the PRC and the world after the crisis of 1989 was played by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Qian Qichen. The biography of Qian Qichen and Jiang Zemin is similar in many ways. The future Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was born in Shanghai. During the war with Japan, he was a member of the communist underground in Shanghai. At one time, both Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen studied in the USSR. Both politicians were repressed during the Cultural Revolution and later gain high positions during the early years of the "policy of reform and openness" [1].

However, if Jiang Zemin remained a regional politician, Qian Qichen, thanks to the fact that he was the protégé of Zhou Enlai's adopted son, Li Peng, from the very beginning built a career in the PRC Foreign Ministry. After rehabilitation, he served as the PRC Ambassador to some African countries, and later became the first speaker of the MOFA. In 1988, he took over as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The name Qian Qichen is associated with the normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States after the incident on Tiananmen Square and between the PRC and the USSR. It was Qian who negotiated with the USSR, and later with the former Soviet republics, to normalize border issues [7, p. 139].

There is an opinion among researchers that Qian, despite his origin, was not originally an ally of Jiang Zemin. He was part of the so-called "Li Peng Group," a small association led by Premier of the State Council Li Peng, Jiang Zemin's main rival for power in the country. However, already at the beginning of the 2000s, he, along with some supporters of Li Peng, began to support Jiang and his policies. However, despite this, he is not included in the "Shanghai clique", an informal group of supporters of Jiang Zemin, in the same way as Zhu Rongji, Deng Xiaoping's longtime protégé and the most consistent supporter of the market reforms in China [5, p. 104].

At one time, he also served as the head of Shanghai and went through a path of formation

similar to Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen, including falling under repression during the Cultural Revolution. After Jiang Zemin was promoted, Zhu Rongji took over as head of the CCP's Shanghai City Committee. In 1991, he took the post of Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. As vice premier in Li Peng's government, Zhu oversaw economic affairs. From 1993 to 1995, he simultaneously served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Director of the People's Bank of China [13]. Already as Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China after Li Peng's resignation, he promoted China's accession to the WTO in 2001 [5, p. 103].

In his book "Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era", Willy Lam, associate professor at the Center for Chinese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, claims that Zhu, like Jiang Zemin, has formed his faction within the CCP. Willy Lam called this group "Technocrats". The faction consisted of officials of the financial and economic block of the Chinese government who actively interacted with external players and were deeply integrated into international economic relations [8, pp. 22-23].

The opposition to the "Technocrats" and the "Shanghai clique" was the so-called "Electric group" headed by Li Peng [5, p. 104]. He was also born in Shanghai in the family of a communist revolutionary from Sichuan, Li Shuxiong. He lost his father at an early age, after which he was adopted by Zhou Enlai. Like Jiang Zemin, Qian Qichen and Zhu Rongji, Li Peng was educated in the USSR, graduating from the Moscow Energy Institute. He worked in positions related to the energy sector in many provinces. Unlike the politicians mentioned above, Li Peng managed to avoid repression during the years of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, in 1966 he was appointed head of the Beijing Electric Power Bureau. After the victory of Deng Xiaoping in 1981, Li Peng was appointed as the Minister of Energy of the PRC. In June 1983 he was appointed as a Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. In 1987 he was elected to the position of the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [16]. Between 1988 and 1993, he headed the so-called Central Leading Group for Foreign Relations under the CPC Central Committee, the party body responsible for making recommendations on foreign policy [9, p. 9].

It is not difficult to see that the most mentioned top leaders of the PRC got an education in the USSR. In addition, several senior leaders of the

PRC from the "third generation" somehow suffered from the radical Maoist policy in connection with the repressions that were carried out during the years of the "Cultural Revolution". This, in turn, influenced their economic and international policies. Each of the politicians, one way or another, was leading a small informal association of their supporters. In addition, each of these politicians, one way or another, participated in the foreign policy pursued by the state, implementing a unified strategy aimed at integrating the PRC into the world economy.

However, the influence of orthodox Maoists in the nineties remained at a fairly high level. The main carriers of the ideas of Maoism in the top leadership of the CPC at that time were the so-called "old guard", headed by Deng Liqun, who had already moved away from active politics in the nineties but still actively influenced it. Bo Yibo, whose son, Bo Xilai, will be arrested in the last years of Hu Jintao's rule during a large-scale anti-corruption campaign, is also called the leading figure of the "old guard" [5, p. 104].

The collapse of the USSR had the most important influence on the foreign policy pursued by the PRC during this period. The Chinese leadership had to hastily establish relations with the new states that appeared near the borders of the PRC. The appearance of radical Islamist and nationalist organizations in the border regions of the countries of Central Asia made this issue particularly relevant, which forced the leadership of the PRC to take up issues of ensuring the security of its borders, even though the new countries, from an ideological point of view, stood on anti-communist positions.

It is worth noting that the Chinese influence on Central Asia, depending on the historical period, varied from the formal recognition of the suzerainty of emperors to the direct entry of some of the tribes, nations and states into the empire. At the same time, regardless of the level of integration, local entities were recognizing their subordinate position to the empire and were included in the Sino-centric system of international relations.

In the face of the independent republics of Central Asia, for the first time in its modern history, the PRC has faced problems associated with indirect security threats like terrorism and extremism. Under such conditions, China's cooperation with the Central Asian states began to play a strategic role. In addition, the foundations built by Jiang Zemin would later enable his heirs to deepen their influence in the region.

The starting point of the modern history of cooperation between the Central Asian republics and the PRC is 1992 when China recognized the

newly created independent republics and established diplomatic relations with them. The nineties cannot be called a period of active action. It was a time to resolve border issues left over from Soviet times, as well as to create the necessary legal framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation [7, p. 139].

An important place in creating the necessary basis for cooperation and resolving security issues was the emergence of the Shanghai Five format, created in 1996. This format established the conditions for the beginning of the regulation process of the relations between the region countries. This is how border disputes between the PRC and the three Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - were settled in 1998, 1999 and 2002, respectively. In 1997, was signed an agreement on the mutual reduction of the number of troops in the border area, under which the countries of the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) reduced troops in the border areas and took other confidence-building measures. In the end, the settlement of relations and mutual benefit based on resolving security and economic issues led to the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 [15, p. 80].

It was in 2001 that the most active military cooperation began both within the framework of the SCO and at the bilateral level. These relationships are diverse, ranging from arms supplies and direct financial assistance to joint military exercises and antiterrorist operations.

It cannot be said that the Chinese ruling elite was not at all engaged in ideological work in foreign policy. So, Jiang Zemin proposed a "New concept of security", which was worked out in 1997-2002 as a fundamentally new approach to the problems of global security. As Jiang Zemin stated in his speech at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, the PRC's "New security concept" is based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination between countries [14, p. 7].

However, the proposed concept, in connection with the trend toward deideologization of foreign policy, did not have a strong connection with the ideology of Sino-Marxism that dominated China and was the response of the Chinese power elites to international processes in the logic of the classical theory of international relations [14, p. 10].

Summing up, we can say that during the reign of Jiang Zemin, there was a final de-ideologization and pragmatization of China's policy in general and foreign policy in particular, which went back to the days of Deng Xiaoping. The symbolic step that demonstrates all the changes that have taken place within the PRC can be called the disappearance of

an article for ideological crimes from the PRC criminal code in 1997 [12, p. 449].

In addition, during the reign of Jiang Zemin, for the first time in many years, was reached a consensus between domestic political players in China. Chinese elites had finally established the political system based on consensus between different political factions within the CCP. Evidence of this is the active inter-factional cooperation between Jiang himself and the heads of other factions. Thus Chairman Jian consistently cooperated with both Li Peng and Zhu Rongji [5, p. 124]. At the same time, one should not forget that after the retirement of Jiang's political competitors, their political factions lost their influence, while the "Shanghai clique" is still a significant political force within the CCP [5, p. 124].

An important result of the rule of Jiang Zemin and other leaders of the "third generation" was the final establishment of a market economy in the PRC. This leads to another important result that can be noted, namely, the deepening of the economic bias in the foreign policy of the PRC within the framework of the socialist market economy. A sign of this can be called the entry of the PRC into the World Trade Organization, in which Zhu Rongzi played the most important role. It was during the reign of Jiang Zemin that the tendency of the Chinese elites to use economic tools in foreign policy appeared, which, over time, will become the hallmark of Chinese diplomacy [2, p. 26].

There is also a suggestion that during the years of President Jiang's rule, an unspoken consensus emerged among intra-party groups about the foreign policy of the PRC. Any internal conflict should not be reflected in global foreign policy or become a reason for the weakening of the PRC. Foreign policy became a field where internal party contradictions were not allowed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be an arena of confrontation, but the officials were obliged to adhere to the political line set by the CCP, without introducing their contradictions into official rhetoric, as this could harm the country's security, which is quite consistent with the idea of the "three ghosts of fear" expressed by Stein Ringen.

In his book "The Ideal Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century," he noted that three so-called "ghosts of fear" influence the formation of the modern worldview of the Chinese [10, pp. 2-4].

First of all, we are talking about the Opium Wars and the transformation of the Chinese Empire into a semi-colony of the Great colonial powers in the 19th century. In just a few decades, China has turned from the strongest state on the planet into an economic appendage, miraculously retaining the remnants of sovereignty. In turn, already in the

twentieth century, this led China to internal fragmentation and civil war between the most influential commanders of the former Army of the Qing Empire. In official historiography, this period was called the Warlord Era. From the point of view of ordinary Chinese, brought up in the key that China is a kind of centre of the world, and all those who are living outside its borders are barbarians, this state of affairs was unacceptable and unfair. In parallel, there came an understanding that the place of the "centre" of the world is not guaranteed and that it must first be returned and then retained [10, pp. 2-4].

The second ghost was the policy pursued by Mao Zedong. Unsuccessful economic reforms, the failure of the Great Leap Forward, massive famine and, as an apotheosis, the Cultural Revolution. From this period, the modern Chinese elites learned the lesson that in the name of the survival of the regime, it is necessary to create a kind of system of checks and balances within both the party and state systems, which would not allow individual functionaries take too much power into their own hands [10, pp. 2-4].

And the third ghost is the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Chinese system of government largely copied the Soviet one. It is logical to assume that problems in one similar system will also arise in another. The reason for the fall of the Soviet Union from the Chinese point of view is the rejection of the past, the debunking of the cult of Stalin and the general weakening of state control over the economy and the population, which led to stagnation and discontent among the broad masses. From what happened the Chinese learned two lessons: the importance of control and feedback. Control over the population cannot be weakened, however, in return, the people should be given the opportunity for self-realization in the economy and their enrichment as a kind of reward for loyalty [10, pp. 2-4].

Since the 90s of the twentieth century, when Jiang Zemin came to power in the PRC, these three "ghosts of fear" have become the factors that largely determined the modern worldview of the Chinese elites and ordinary Chinese. Because of these "ghosts", the Chinese elites are doing everything to avoid the recurrence of situations, many of which they experienced themselves.

Summing up, we can state that the actions of the Chinese political elites are often dictated by the fact that they are trying to avoid the situations described above. Therefore based on the preceding, it is much easier to understand the motives and analyze the actions of the PRC political elite both in foreign and domestic policy.

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