AI: Wealth Builder or Workforce Threat

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Аннотация: Во всём мире искусственный интеллект перестал быть футуристической концепцией. Он пишет, анализирует, прогнозирует и принимает решения. Для одних ИИ является неутомимым помощником, открывающим беспрецедентные возможности для роста производительности и благосостояния. Для других он воспринимается как невидимый конкурент, который незаметно трансформирует рабочие места и вызывает неопределённость в карьере. Те же технологии, которая обещают процветание, одновременно ставят тревожный вопрос: создаёт ли ИИ благополучия – или разрушает рынок труда?
В данной статье рассматривается историческое развитие искусственного интеллекта и анализируется его влияние на жизнь человека с особым акцентом на как положительные, так и отрицательные последствия его внедрения. В заключение предлагается ряд рекомендаций, направленных на максимизацию выгод от использования ИИ и смягчение его неблагоприятных эффектов, особенно для уязвимых групп населения.
Ключевые слова и словосочетания: искусственный интеллект; благосостояние населения; трансформация рабочей силы; история искусственного интеллекта; генеративный искусственный интеллект; ChatGPT; технологическая безработица; вытеснение рабочих мест

ԱԲ. բարեկեցության ստեղծո՞ղ, թե՞ աշխատուժի սպառնալիք

Շահնազարյան Գագիկ Հ.
Մարքեթինգի և բիզնեսի կազմակերպման ֆակուլտետի բիզնես վարչարարության ամբիոնի դասախոս
Հայաստանի պետական տնտեսագիտական համալսարան (Երևան, ՀՀ)
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Կառավարման ֆակուլտետի Կառավարում ամբիոնի տ.գ.թ., դոցենտ
Հայաստանի պետական տնտեսագիտական համալսարան (Երևան, ՀՀ)

Ամփոփագիր. Ամբողջ աշխարհում արհեստական բանականությունը այլևս ապագայի հայեցակարգ չէ: Այն գրում է, վերլուծում, կանխատեսում և որոշումներ է կայացնում: Ոմանց համար ԱԲ-ն անփոխարինելի օգնական է, որը բացում է աննախադեպ արտադրողականության և բարեկեցության հնարավորություններ: Մյուսների համար այն նման է անտեսանելի մրցակցի, որը լուռ կերպով վերափոխում է աշխատատեղերը և անհանգստություն է առաջացնում աշխատաշուկայում: Նույն այդ տեխնոլոգիան, որ խոստանում է բարգավաճում, միաժամանակ առաջադրում է մտահոգիչ հարց՝ արդյո՞ք ԱԲ-ն կառուցում է բարեկեցություն, թե՞ քայքայում է աշխատանքի շուկան:

Այս հոդվածը ուսումնասիրում է արհեստական բանականության պատմական զարգացումը և վերլուծում դրա ազդեցությունը մարդկային կյանքի վրա՝ հատուկ ուշադրություն դարձնելով դրական և բացասական հետևանքներին: Վերջում այն կատարում է առաջարկներ, որոնք նպատակ ունեն առավելագույնի հասցնել ԱԲ-ի օգուտները՝ միաժամանակ մեղմելով դրա բացասական ազդեցությունները, հատկապես հասարակության խոցելի խմբերի համար:
Հանգուցաբառեր և բառակապակցություններ՝ Արհեստական բանականություն, Բնակչության բարեկեցություն, Աշխատուժի վերափոխում; Արհեստական բանականության պատմություն; Գեներատիվ արհեստական բանականություն; ChatGPT; Տեխնոլոգիական գործազրկություն; Աշխատատեղերի փոխարինում

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the most transformative technological fields of the modern era, influencing science, industry, and daily life. According to Oxford Learners Dictionary artificial intelligence is the study and development of computer systems that can copy intelligent human behaviour [**13**]. According to Cambridge Dictionary artificial intelligence is the use or study of computer systems or machines that have some of the qualities that the human brain has, such as the ability to interpret and produce language in a way that seems human, recognize or create images, solve problems, and learn from data supplied to them [**12**]. AI history is marked by periods of optimism, disappointment, and resurgence, reflecting both the ambition of its goals and the limitations of technology at different points in time. From early philosophical questions about machine intelligence to today's powerful generative models, AI has evolved through several distinct phases.

Early Foundations (1940s–1950s): The intellectual roots of artificial intelligence predate digital computers. In the 1940s, mathematicians and logicians began exploring whether human reasoning could be formalized. A pivotal figure was **Alan Turing**, who in 1950 published "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" [**5**], introducing the famous **Turing Test** as a criterion for machine intelligence. Turing proposed that if a machine could converse indistinguishably from a human, it should be considered intelligent.

Early Optimism and Symbolic AI (1950s–1960s): The field of AI formally began in **1956** at the **Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence** [**8**], organized by John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Claude Shannon, and Nathaniel Rochester. This workshop is widely regarded as the birth of AI as a scientific discipline. The term "artificial intelligence" was coined there, and participants optimistically believed that human-level intelligence could be achieved within a few decades. Following Dartmouth, AI research focused on **symbolic reasoning**, also known as "good old-fashioned AI." Early programs such as the **Logic Theorist** (1955) [**1**] and **ELIZA** (1966) demonstrated that computers could manipulate symbols and simulate aspects of human reasoning and conversation [**3**]. These systems relied on explicitly programmed rules rather than learning from data. During this period, funding from governments—especially in the United States—was abundant. Researchers believed that tasks such as machine translation, vision, and general problem-solving were close to being solved. However, these expectations soon proved overly optimistic.

AI Winters and the Rise of Expert Systems (1970s–1980s): By the 1970s, limitations in computing power and algorithmic approaches became apparent. Early neural networks, such as perceptrons, were criticized for their inability to solve complex problems. Major reports, including the **ALPAC report** [4] on machine translation and the **Lighthill report** [**17**] in the UK, led to reduced funding. These periods of declining interest and investment are known as **AI winters** [**2**]. Despite setbacks, AI found renewed success in the 1980s through **expert systems**—programs designed to replicate the decision-making abilities of human specialists using rule-based knowledge. Notable examples include **MYCIN** in medical diagnosis and **XCON** at Digital Equipment Corporation, which saved millions of dollars by automating system configuration. However, expert systems were expensive to maintain, inflexible, and difficult to scale. When they failed to meet commercial expectations, AI entered a second major winter in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Machine Learning and the Deep Learning Revolution (1990s–2010s): The resurgence of AI began with **machine learning**, which shifted the focus from hand-coded rules to systems that learn patterns from data. Statistical methods and probabilistic models gained popularity, particularly in speech recognition and computer vision. A major turning point occurred in **2012**, when a deep neural network called **AlexNet** [**6**] won the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge by a significant margin. Developed by Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey Hinton, AlexNet demonstrated that **deep learning**, powered by large datasets and GPUs, could outperform traditional approaches. This breakthrough triggered widespread adoption of deep learning across industries, leading to rapid advances in image recognition, speech processing, and natural language understanding.

Generative AI and Large Language Models (2017–Present): The most recent phase in AI history is characterized by **generative models** and **large language models (LLMs)**. A key innovation was the **Transformer architecture**, introduced in 2017, which enabled models to process vast amounts of data efficiently. Transformers laid the foundation for models such as **BERT**, **GPT**, and other foundation models. These systems are trained on massive text corpora and can perform a wide range of tasks, including translation, summarization, code generation, and conversational interaction. Generative AI systems such as ChatGPT illustrate how decades of research in AI, machine learning, and natural language processing have converged [**10**]. Recent academic work categorizes generative AI into stages ranging from rule-based systems to deep generative models and large-scale foundation models, highlighting how the field has evolved over more than 70 years [**16**].

As we can see the history of artificial intelligence is not a linear path of constant progress, but a cycle of ambition, limitation, and renewal. Early optimism gave way to AI winters, which in turn laid the groundwork for more robust approaches such as machine learning and deep learning. Today's generative AI systems represent the most advanced stage yet, combining powerful algorithms, massive data, and unprecedented computational resources. As AI continues to shape society, its past reminds us that technological progress depends as much on patience and realism as on innovation.

As we can see, from its early foundations to the present day, artificial intelligence (AI) has been embedded in human life and has primarily manifested as an assistive technology. Its core purpose has been to support human activity and reduce cognitive and physical effort, thereby making everyday tasks more efficient. In this sense, AI emerged as an attempt to transcend the limitations of human cognition and labor, enabling individuals to perform tasks that would otherwise require superior expertise, greater resources, or collective effort.

This trajectory reached a significant milestone with the emergence of generative AI, most notably marked by the public release of ChatGPT on November 30, 2022. ChatGPT became the first widely successful generative AI system that allowed users to interact with machines using natural language rather than formal programming languages or complex scripts. Users could express requests informally, with imprecision or grammatical errors, and still receive coherent and relevant responses. This represented a major technological achievement, transforming a long-standing aspiration—communicating with machines as naturally as with humans—into a practical reality.

As a result, even individuals who had previously been skeptical of AI began to adopt such systems and recognize their value in simplifying daily activities. The reliance on memorization and prior expertise diminished: students could first consult AI systems to clarify unfamiliar concepts before approaching tutors; junior employees could seek guidance from AI tools instead of immediately escalating issues to senior colleagues. In this way, AI enabled individuals to present ideas more effectively, articulate opinions beyond their formal expertise, and complete at least basic tasks under AI guidance without being specialists.

During this phase, AI could be characterized as a ubiquitous companion or "best friend" of users, made possible by conversational interaction. AI systems assumed multiple roles simultaneously—serving as guides, virtual senior colleagues, consultants, advisors, psychologists, and living libraries—fundamentally reshaping how individuals access knowledge, solve problems, and perform intellectual work.

Now lets see above in numbers. For this purpose we will use "The state of AI in 2025: Agents, innovation, and transformation" survey completed by Mckinsey & Company and published on November 5, 2025 [**11**].

The figure 1. illustrates the steady and then accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence within organizations over the period 2017–2025, based on McKinsey Global Survey data. In the early phase (2017–2019), AI adoption shows a rapid initial increase, reflecting early experimentation and pilot deployments. This growth is followed by a period of relative stagnation and fluctuation between 2020 and 2022, suggesting that organizations faced structural, technical, and organizational barriers when attempting to scale AI beyond isolated use cases.

A notable inflection point occurs from 2023 onward, where adoption rates increase sharply. This acceleration coincides with the widespread availability of generative AI systems, particularly large language models, which significantly lowered the technical and cognitive barriers to AI use. Unlike earlier AI systems that required specialized expertise and integration into specific business functions, generative AI enabled broad, cross-functional adoption through natural-language interaction.

The stacked bar on the right side of the figure highlights the distribution of AI usage intensity across organizations. A substantial proportion of organizations now report AI use in multiple business functions, indicating a transition from experimental adoption toward operational integration. This shift suggests that AI is no longer perceived merely as a niche technological enhancement, but rather as a general-purpose capability embedded across organizational processes. Overall, the figure supports the interpretation that AI adoption has evolved through three distinct phases: an initial phase of optimism and experimentation, a middle phase characterized by consolidation and limited scalability, and a recent phase of rapid diffusion driven by generative AI. This pattern underscores the role of usability, accessibility, and human-AI interaction paradigms in determining the pace and depth of technological adoption. The data further imply that generative AI acts as a catalyst, transforming AI from a specialized tool into an everyday cognitive infrastructure within organizations.



Figure 1. *Use of AI by Respondents' Organizations, (% of Respondents) Organizations that Use AI in at Least 1 Business Function*[1] [**11**]



Figure 2. *Phase of AI Agent Use at Respondents' Organizations, By Business Function (% of Respondents*[2] *(n=1,933)* [**11**]

[1] In 2017, the definition for Al use was using Al in a core part of the organization's business or at scale. In 2018-19, the definition was embedding at least 1 Al capability in business processes or products. From 2020, the definition was that the organization has adopted Al in at least 1 function, and in 2025, the definition was regular use of Al in at least 1 function.
[2] Note: Figures may not sum to 100%, because of rounding.
'Question was asked only of respondents who reported regular use of Al in the respective functions and was rebased to reflect the total sample.

The figure 2. highlights the uneven impact of artificial intelligence across the workforce. While a clear majority of roles remain in low-exposure categories, a smaller yet significant share of workers faces moderate to high levels of AI-driven task transformation. This distribution challenges the notion of AI as a uniform force of job destruction. Instead, it suggests a bifurcated outcome: for many, AI functions as a productivity-enhancing assistant, while for others it introduces heightened risks of displacement or role erosion. The data underscores that the central challenge is not mass unemployment, but unequal adaptation—where access to skills, reskilling opportunities, and institutional support determines whether AI becomes a tool for wealth creation or a driver of workforce insecurity.



Picture 1. *Al agent use that has reached the scaling phase, by industry and business function (% of respondents)*[3] [11]

As per Picture 1. use of Al agents is most often reported by respondents working in technology, media and telecommunications, and healthcare. It demonstrates that AI adoption across organizational functions remains highly uneven, with a limited number of domains accounting for a disproportionate share of reported use cases. This pattern suggests that AI diffusion is currently selective and opportunity-driven rather than systemic. Although generative AI has reduced technical and cost barriers to entry, effective integration continues to favor functions with clear value propositions, readily automatable tasks, and lower organizational friction. Consequently, AI is most often deployed as an assistive, modular capability rather than as a fully transformative organizational infrastructure.

At the functional level, agent use is most frequently reported in IT and knowledge management, where agentic applications—such as service-desk support in IT and advanced research assistance in knowledge management—have matured relatively quickly. From an industry perspective, AI agent adoption is most prevalent in the technology, media and telecommunications, and healthcare sectors, reflecting both higher digital readiness and stronger incentives for early experimentation.

[3] Includes respondents who answered "scaling" and "fully scaled." Question was asked only of respondents who reported regular use of Al in the respective functions and was rebased to reflect the total sample. In technology, n = 237; insurance, n= 80; healthcare, n129; media and telecommunications, n = 93; energy and materi-als, n=141; advanced manufacturing (includes advanced electronics, aerospace, automotive and assembly, and semiconductors), n = 118; professional services (includes legal services, management consulting, market research, and product research), n=259; consumer goods and retail, n = 116; travel, logistics, and infrastruc-ture, n=75; engineering, construction, and building materials, n = 77; banking and other financial institutions, n = 153; pharmaceuticals and medical products, n = 78.



Figure 3. *Business Functions at Respondents' Organizations That Are Using AI (% of Respondents)*[4] [**11**]

The figure 3. illustrates differentiated trajectories of AI adoption and maturity across organizational functions, revealing substantial variation in both timing and scale. Some functions demonstrate early and sustained growth, indicating faster progression from experimentation to operational deployment, while others exhibit delayed uptake followed by more recent acceleration. This divergence highlights that AI diffusion is not synchronized across the organization but instead follows function-specific dynamics shaped by data availability, task structure, and integration complexity. Functions showing steeper and earlier growth curves tend to be those characterized by high information intensity and standardized workflows, which allow AI systems to be integrated with relatively low organizational friction. In contrast, functions with slower or more gradual adoption trajectories likely face higher coordination costs, greater dependency on tacit human expertise, or increased regulatory and ethical constraints. The staggered growth patterns suggest that AI scaling is constrained less by technological capability than by organizational readiness and contextual fit. Notably, the figure also suggests a recent acceleration phase across multiple functions, consistent with the broader diffusion of generative and agent-based AI systems. These systems reduce the need for specialized technical skills and enable more flexible, task-level augmentation. However, despite this acceleration, the absence of convergence toward uniformly high adoption levels indicates that AI remains embedded in existing functional silos rather than serving as a fully integrated organizational infrastructure. Overall, the figure reinforces the interpretation that contemporary AI adoption follows an incremental and modular path. Organizations appear to prioritize functional optimization over systemic transformation, deploying AI where immediate efficiency gains are visible while postponing deeper structural redesign. This pattern underscores the continuing gap between the potential of AI as a general-purpose technology and its realized role as a function-specific, assistive capability.

Overall, the report have key findings:

1. *Most organizations are still in the experimentation or piloting phase:* Nearly two-thirds of respondents say their organizations have not yet begun scaling AI across the enterprise.

2. *High curiosity in AI agents:* Sixty-two percent of survey respondents say their organizations are at least experimenting with AI agents.

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[4] 'In 2021, n=1,843; in 2022, n=1,492; in 2023, n=1,684; in Feb-Mar 2024, n=1,363; in July 2024, n1,491; in June-July 2025, n1,993. The survey question asks about 11 functions: HR; IT; manufacturing: marketing and sales; product and/or service development; risk, legal, and compliance; service operations; software engineering; strategy and corporate finance; supply chain/inventory management; and knowledge management.

3. *Positive leading indicators on impact of AI:* Respondents report use-case-level cost and revenue benefits, and 64 percent say that AI is enabling their innovation. However, just 39 percent report EBIT impact at the enterprise level.

4. *High performers use AI to drive growth, innovation, and cost:* Eighty percent of respondents say their companies set efficiency as an objective of their AI initiatives, but the companies seeing the most value from AI often set growth or innovation as additional objectives.

5. *Redesigning workflows is a key success factor:* Half of those AI high performers intend to use AI to transform their businesses, and most are redesigning workflows.

6. *Differing perspectives on employment impact:* Respondents vary in their expectations of AI's impact on the overall workforce size of their organizations in the coming years: 32 percent expect decreases, 43 percent no change, and 13 percent increases [**11**].

Despite the positive adoption trends discussed above, the expanding involvement of artificial intelligence also has important negative implications. At the individual level, extensive reliance on AI systems may reduce motivation for deep learning, sustained educational effort, and skill acquisition, potentially encouraging superficial understanding and cognitive dependency. Although these effects are difficult to quantify empirically, they raise concerns regarding long-term human capital development.

More critically, at the organizational and macroeconomic levels, AI-driven productivity gains introduce labor-market risks. As AI systems increase both the speed and quality of work, organizations operating under relatively stable economic growth conditions may require fewer employees to deliver the same level of output. In such settings, productivity improvements may translate not into employment growth but into workforce redundancies. Until recently, these risks were largely theoretical. However, by 2024–2025, tangible signals began to emerge. In May 2025, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) announced the layoff of approximately 1,500 employees in the United States, representing about 2% of its U.S. workforce, as reported by Reuters. Earlier, Reuters also reported that PwC was considering cutting up to half of its financial services audit staff in China, amid regulatory investigations and significant client departures. During the same period, Reuters reported that KPMG planned to lay off less than 4% (around 330 employees) of its U.S. audit workforce. Additionally, in 2025, PwC shut down operations in nine Sub-Saharan African countries following a strategic review of its global operations, according to Reuters [9].

According to CNN Business 41% of companies worldwide plan to reduce workforces by 2030 due to AI. Citing the World Economic Forum's *Future of Jobs Report*, 41% of employers globally plan to downsize their workforce as artificial intelligence automates certain tasks. While 77% of companies also intend to reskill or upskill employees between 2025 and 2030 to work alongside AI, the report no longer characterizes AI as a clear net positive for job creation. Demand is expected to grow for AI-related and specialist roles, while administrative, clerical, and some creative occupations are projected to decline, indicating that AI adoption may simultaneously drive workforce transformation and displacement [**15**].

Recent research indicates growing concern that AI adoption will disproportionately affect entry-level roles. Around four in ten employees believe junior positions could disappear within the next five years, a concern mirrored by employers' hiring intentions. According to Randstad's Workmonitor 2026 [**14**], 38% of employers plan to reduce graduate recruitment due to AI, while 41% of workers expect entry-level roles to be replaced. Despite these fears, most employees report productivity gains from AI, with 62% saying it has improved their work performance, though nearly half believe the benefits will accrue more to companies than to workers. Expert commentary suggests that AI is already automating tasks traditionally assigned to junior staff, allowing firms to rely on smaller teams overseeing AI outputs. However, HR leaders warn that replacing graduate roles risks weakening long-term talent pipelines, increasing future recruitment costs, and undermining organizational culture. At the same time, demand for AI skills is accelerating: employers are investing heavily in AI agents, job postings requiring AI experience have surged, and recruitment processes are being redesigned to assess candidates' ability to work effectively with AI. The emerging consensus is that successful organizations will not replace early-career roles entirely, but redesign them so AI handles routine tasks while graduates focus on developing judgment, collaboration, and problem-solving skills [7].

Taken together, these developments do not prove that AI adoption alone caused workforce reductions; regulatory pressures, market conditions, and organizational restructuring also played important roles. Nevertheless, they indicate that AI-enabled efficiency gains can accelerate labor adjustments, particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors, reinforcing concerns that AI may function not only as a productivity-enhancing tool but also as a catalyst for structural employment displacement.

Taken together, the evidence discussed above places countries in a position where strategic choices regarding artificial intelligence are unavoidable. Governments are increasingly confronted with the question not of *whether* AI will reshape economies and labor markets, but of *how* this transformation should be governed. In this context, several broad policy approaches can be identified.

A first, purely restrictive approach would involve attempting to halt or significantly limit the development and deployment of AI technologies, relying instead on traditional production and labor models. In practice, such a strategy is neither feasible nor sustainable. AI development is inherently global, driven by international competition, cross-border research collaboration, and multinational corporate investment. Restricting AI within a single country would neither slow global technological progress nor prevent domestic exposure to AI-driven economic pressures. On the contrary, unilateral restrictions would likely erode national competitiveness, widen productivity gaps, and increase dependence on foreign technologies. Consequently, prohibition-based strategies cannot constitute a viable long-term solution.

A second and more realistic approach recognizes that AI development is irreversible and must therefore be actively managed rather than resisted. From this perspective, the role of the state shifts toward shaping conditions under which societies can maximize the benefits of AI while mitigating its adverse effects—particularly for vulnerable groups such as older workers and individuals lacking up-to-date skills or formal education. In this context we propose a coherent policy framework that treats AI not merely as a technological challenge, but as a structural transformation requiring coordinated interventions across education, labor markets, taxation, and social policy.

Within this framework, several policy directions are proposed.

First, governments should actively promote the responsible use of AI across all major domains of national life, including education, labor markets, economic production, healthcare, public administration, culture, and social services. Rather than limiting AI adoption to isolated sectors, policy should encourage broad diffusion to ensure that productivity gains and efficiency improvements are distributed across society rather than concentrated in a small number of industries or firms.

Second, sustained investment in AI education must become a core element of national human capital strategy. AI literacy should be introduced at the school level and systematically expanded through higher education and vocational training. The objective is not merely to produce AI engineers, but to ensure that future generations are proficient users of AI tools and capable of critically interacting with intelligent systems. Early exposure will reduce future skill mismatches and enhance workforce adaptability.

Third, fiscal incentives can play a decisive role in accelerating responsible AI adoption. Governments may introduce targeted tax incentives or credits for companies that integrate AI at defined levels of maturity within their production or service processes. Such incentives should be conditional on compliance with ethical standards, transparency requirements, and workforce transition commitments, ensuring that efficiency gains do not come at the expense of social stability.

Fourth, dedicated public or semi-public agencies should be established to support occupational transition and reskilling. These institutions would focus on workers whose specializations are no longer aligned with current labor-market demand, offering structured pathways for retraining, career redirection, and skills certification. Unlike ad-hoc retraining programs, such agencies would operate continuously, anticipating labor-market shifts rather than reacting to mass displacement after it occurs.

Fifth, specific measures are required to address the challenges faced by older workers. Rather than forcing premature labor-market exit, governments could create adapted employment opportunities within the public sector where accumulated experience remains valuable. In parallel, favorable loan schemes could be offered to older individuals willing to engage in agriculture, small-scale entrepreneurship, or local service provision. These programs should be complemented by tax incentives, access to expert guidance, training courses, and ongoing advisory support, enabling older workers to remain economically active and socially integrated.

Finally, to encourage individual initiative in skill development, partial tax refunds or credits could be introduced for individuals who invest in certified AI-related education or training programs. Such measures would lower financial barriers to lifelong learning and reinforce the principle that workforce adaptation is a shared responsibility between individuals, employers, and the state.

Conclusion

In summary, artificial intelligence has evolved from a widely perceived assistive technology—designed to support individuals and enhance productivity—into a source of significant economic and social disruption. While AI continues to function as a powerful tool that augments human capabilities, its rapid integration into labor markets has also begun to displace workers and destabilize traditional employment structures. As demonstrated throughout this study, these effects are no longer merely speculative but are increasingly observable in practice.

Importantly, this transformation is irreversible. Attempts to resist or halt AI development are neither feasible nor economically sustainable. Consequently, the appropriate response is not fear or passive adaptation, but deliberate and coordinated action. In this context, governments emerge as the central actors responsible for shaping the trajectory of AI-driven transformation. Market forces alone are insufficient to ensure socially balanced outcomes, particularly for vulnerable groups facing skill obsolescence and employment insecurity.

The novelty of this approach lies in reframing AI not as an isolated technological disruption but as a systemic transformation requiring proactive, inclusive, and multi-level governance. By combining education reform, fiscal incentives, labor-market institutions, and targeted social protection, countries can shift from reactive mitigation toward strategic adaptation, ensuring that AI serves as a driver of broad-based development rather than a source of deepening inequality. Ultimately, the long-term impact of AI will depend less on the technology itself than on the policy choices made today. Effective governance can ensure that AI strengthens human potential and social resilience rather than undermining them.

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