Theoretical and Legal Boundaries of the Concept of Legal Culture and the Problem of Its Systemic Understanding

Asatryan Armen L.
PhD in Law, Associate Professor, Chair of Theory and History of State and Law, Faculty of Law, Yerevan State University (Yerevan, RA)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2245-0307
asatryan.armen@gmail.com
Beglaryan Zhorzheta M.
PhD student, Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law NAS RA (Yerevan, RA)
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-3994-5026
zhorzheta.beglaryan@edu.isec.am

UDC: 340.1; **EDN:** HCDORQ
DOI: 10.58587/18292437-2026.5-106
Keywords & phrases: legal culture, legal system, legal values, legal tradition, legal subculture, legal civilization, rule-of-law state, cultural relevance, cultural gap, self-corrective capacity, systemic approach

Իրավական մշակույթի հասկացության տեսաիրավական սահմանները և համակարգային ըմբռնման հիմնախնդիրը

Ասատրյան Արմեն Լ.
Իրավաբանական գիտությունների թեկնածու, դոցենտ, Երևանի պետական համալսարանի իրավագիտության ֆակուլտետի Պետության և իրավունքի տեսության ու պատմության ամբիոնի դոցենտ (Երևան, ՀՀ)
Բեգլարյան Ժորժետա Մ.
ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Փիլիսոփայության, սոցիոլոգիայի և իրավունքի ինստիտուտի հայցորդ (Երևան, ՀՀ)

Ամփոփագիր. Հոդվածի նպատակը իրավական մշակույթի հասկացության այնպիսի տեսաիրավական սահմանների ձևակերպումն է, որոնք թույլ են տալիս այն տարբերել իրավական համակարգից, իրավագիտակցությունից և իրավական գաղափարախոսությունից՝ առանց դրանց փոխկապվածությունը ժխտելու: Համակարգային, գործառութային, համեմատական և մարդաբանական մոտեցումների համադրմամբ հիմնավորվում է «մշակութային վերաբերելիության» չափանիշը՝ իրավական երևույթը մշակութային է այնքանով, որքանով այն արտահայտում է իրավունքի ստեղծման, ընկալման, հիմնավորման, իրացման, պաշտպանության կամ փոխանցման կայուն և վերարտադրվող եղանակ: Տարանջատվում են իրավական մշակույթի նկարագրական և գնահատողական շերտերը, հասարակական, խմբային և անհատական մակարդակները: Հեղինակային մոտեցմամբ առաջարկվում է «մշակութային խզում» հասկացության կառուցվածքային տարբերակումը, իսկ իրավական մշակույթի ներքին ամբողջականությունը դիտարկվում է ոչ թե որպես հակասությունների բացակայություն, այլ որպես դրանց հայտնաբերման, հրապարակային քննարկման և հաստատութային ուղղման կարողություն: Առաջարկվում է իրավական մշակույթի գնահատման բազմաչափ շրջանակ՝ նորմատիվ որակի, հաստատութային կիրառման, իրավական հասանելիության և ինքնուղղման կարողության համադրությամբ: Այս ըմբռնումը իրավական մշակույթը դարձնում է ոչ միայն նկարագրական հասկացություն, այլև իրավակարգի որակի և իրավական բարեփոխումների կայունության գնահատման տեսաիրավական գործիք:
Հանգուցաբառեր և բառակապակցություններ՝ իրավական մշակույթ, իրավական համակարգ, իրավական արժեքներ, իրավական ավանդույթ, իրավական ենթամշակույթ, իրավական քաղաքակրթություն, իրավական պետություն, մշակութային վերաբերելիություն, մշակութային խզում, ինքնուղղման կարողություն, համակարգային մոտեցում

Теоретико-правовые границы понятия правовой культуры и проблема её системного осмысления

Асатрян Армен Л.
Кандидат юридических наук, доцент кафедры теории и истории государства и права юридического факультета, Ереванский государственный университет (Ереван, РА)
Бегларян Жоржета М.
Соискатель Института философии, социологии и права НАН РА (Ереван, РА)

Аннотация. Проблема определения теоретико-правовых границ понятия правовой культуры имеет принципиальное значение для его разграничения с правовой системой, правосознанием и правовой идеологией. В статье на основе сочетания системного, функционального, сравнительного и антропологического подходов обосновывается критерий «культурной релевантности»: правовое явление относится к правовой культуре постольку, поскольку выражает устойчивые и воспроизводимые способы создания, восприятия, обоснования, реализации, защиты или передачи права. Разграничиваются описательный и оценочный слои правовой культуры, а также общественный, групповой и индивидуальный уровни. Автор предлагает структурную дифференциацию понятия «культурный разрыв», рассматривая внутреннюю целостность правовой культуры не как отсутствие противоречий, а как способность выявлять их, публично обсуждать и институционально корректировать.

Предлагается многомерная модель оценки правовой культуры, сочетающая качество нормативного регулирования, институциональную реализацию, правовую доступность и способность к самокоррекции.

Такой подход делает правовую культуру не только описательным понятием, но и наглядным теоретико-правовым инструментом оценки качества правовой системы и устойчивости правовых реформ.

Ключевые слова и словосочетания: правовая культура, правовая система, правовые ценности, правовая традиция, правовая субкультура, правовая цивилизация, правовое государство, культурная релевантность, культурный разрыв, способность к самокоррекции, системный подход

The central research question is under what conditions a norm, institution, procedure or pattern of conduct within the legal system becomes a phenomenon of legal culture as such. This formulation makes it possible to avoid two widespread extremes: identifying legal culture with the whole of legal reality, and reducing it merely to the level of knowledge of law or respect for legislation. The purpose of this article is to identify the delimiting characteristics of legal culture and to propose a theoretical framework applicable to general theoretical, comparative and empirical research.

The methodological basis of the study combines structural-systemic, functional, comparative and anthropological approaches. The analysis proceeds through the sequence “existence of the phenomenon - cultural quality - evaluative assessment - mode of reproduction”. The scientific novelty is expressed in four interrelated propositions: clarification of the delimiting criterion of “cultural relevance”; structural differentiation of the concept of a “cultural gap”; interpretation of the integrity of legal culture as a capacity for self-correction; and systematization of multidimensional criteria for its assessment.

The first methodological problem in the theory of legal culture is to determine the scope of the concept. If legal culture is taken to include every phenomenon of legal life - from norms and courts to education, conduct and public opinion - it ceases to perform a differentiating scientific function and becomes an evaluative duplicate of the concept of the “legal system”. The opposite extreme is to reduce legal culture to knowledge of law or respect for legislation, thereby excluding from view the institutional quality of law-making and law enforcement, professional practices and forms of legal communication. What is therefore required is not the broadest possible definition, but a boundary capable of showing which characteristic of legal reality makes a given phenomenon cultural [**9**; **15**].

For this delimitation, it is useful to distinguish the existence of a legal phenomenon from its cultural quality. The existence of a statute is a fact of the legal system; the comprehensibility of its language, the publicity of the procedure by which it is adopted, respect for its addressee and the predictability of its application are characteristics of legal culture. Likewise, the existence of a court is an institutional fact, whereas fairness in the allocation of cases, the parties’ genuine opportunity to be heard, the quality of reasoning and the explainability of departures from prior approaches are cultural dimensions. This distinction helps to avoid circular reasoning in which every positive legal phenomenon is labelled “cultural” and its positive character is then justified by its very inclusion in culture [**2**; **8**].

The distinction between the descriptive and evaluative layers of legal culture is equally fundamental. The descriptive perspective makes it possible to record legal practices that are actually widespread, even when they conflict with constitutional values. The evaluative perspective, by contrast, requires disclosure of the criterion by which a particular practice is assessed as developed, regressive or distorted. Scientific neutrality here does not mean abandoning value judgments; it means making the evaluative criterion explicit, identifying its normative source, and applying the same criterion consistently to comparable phenomena [**12**; **17**; **18**].

The complexity of the concept of “legal culture” stems from the polysemy of both “law” and “culture”. If culture is defined as the totality of material and spiritual values created by human beings, legal culture can easily become another name for the legal system. If it is confined to knowledge of and respect for law, the qualitative dimensions of law-making, law enforcement, professional conduct and institutions fall outside the analysis. An adequate definition must encompass the axiological, cognitive and practical dimensions of legal life without absorbing legal reality in its entirety [**2**; **8**].

At least four major approaches have emerged in the scholarly literature. The activity-based approach links legal culture to the forms and outcomes of legal activity. The axiological approach emphasizes the internalization of legal values and the progressive quality of legal phenomena. The systemic approach treats legal culture as the qualitative state of the elements of the legal system. The anthropological approach focuses on everyday attitudes, practices and meanings associated with law. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, provided that the substantive bearers of culture and the criteria for evaluating it are distinguished [**2**; **8**; **15**].

The strength of M. G. Baumova's definition lies in presenting legal culture as a form of spiritual-material culture and as a system of legal values reflecting the quality of legislation, legal consciousness, legal practice and the legal development of the individual. At the same time, the inclusion of "all progressive legal phenomena" creates a risk of circular definition: the progressive is first determined by an independent criterion and is then included within culture. On this basis, the present study separates the descriptive and evaluative dimensions of culture [**2**].

In its descriptive sense, legal culture reveals how legal meanings are created, communicated, perceived and applied in a particular society. In its evaluative sense, it shows the extent to which these modes correspond to human dignity, freedom, equality, justice, legal certainty and responsibility. The first sense makes it possible to study negative or mixed practices as well; the second makes it possible to distinguish developed from distorted states of legal culture [**14**; **15**].

To determine the boundaries of legal culture, this study employs the criterion of "cultural relevance". Every element of the legal system belongs to the field of legal culture insofar as it expresses a stable mode of creating, perceiving or implementing law. The text of a statute, for example, is a materialized product of culture not only through its substantive content but also through its language, structure, publicity and adoption procedure. A court becomes a cultural institution insofar as its practices consistently embody independence, the right to be heard, reasoned decision-making and equality of the parties [**9**].

On the basis of this criterion, the legal system and legal culture can be distinguished. The legal system answers the question of what norms, institutions and processes exist, whereas legal culture asks with what quality and through what modes of meaning they operate. A highly developed normative system may coexist with a weak culture of law enforcement, while in certain communities or professional groups a high degree of legal responsibility may partly compensate for legislative deficiencies.

Under the proposed definition, legal culture is the axiological-normative, cognitive, institutional and practical quality of the legal life of society, a social group and the individual, expressed in stable modes of creating, perceiving, justifying, implementing, protecting and transmitting law. This definition combines the objectified and subjective dimensions of culture without identifying legal culture with the totality of the legal system [**9**; **11**].

Legal culture exists at three levels. The societal level includes legal traditions, dominant values, legislative and judicial practices, and public legal discourse. The group level encompasses professional, organizational, territorial and generational subcultures. The individual level is manifested in a person's legal knowledge, evaluations, capacities and conduct. These levels interact with one another: a professional subculture may improve societal standards or, conversely, reproduce closed and self-protective practices [**9**].

The sociological layer of the concept is important because a legal system never operates only through its official texts. In L. Friedman's work, legal culture is associated with the social expectations and attitudes that orient the functioning of legal institutions. This approach explains why identical or similar normative structures may produce different behavioural outcomes in different societies. At the same time, limiting the analysis to subjective expectations is insufficient: legal culture also includes the institutional practices through which public authority responds to those expectations and itself shapes them [**9**; **11**].

The anthropological perspective shifts the study of legal culture to the level of everyday legal experience. A person encounters law not only through the text of a code or a judicial act, but also through the physical environment of a court, the speech of a public official, the manner in which queues are organized, the structure of a document, the process of using an online service, and whether the person's arguments are visible in the final decision. Such apparently minor forms may consistently communicate meanings of equality, subordination, accessibility or alienation. The theory of legal culture includes them not as external decoration but as factors affecting the social perception of one's legal position [**14**].

For comparative jurisprudence, the concept of "legal culture" is especially useful when it is not employed to rank entire societies on a single hierarchical scale. D. Nelken's warning that legal culture should be used for a clearly defined research purpose helps to avoid the simplistic opposition between "high" and "low" cultures. What can be

compared are specific functions: legal certainty, access to judicial protection, contractual predictability, public participation and professional independence. A high score in one field does not establish the overall superiority of an entire culture, and a single deficiency does not characterize the whole legal experience of a society [**15**; **19**].

The idea of legal subcultures fills the gap between societal and individual levels. Judges, lawyers, prosecutors, public officials, entrepreneurs and particular territorial communities develop professional and group norms that may support common legal values or depart from them. Closed professional solidarity, concealment of errors and rejection of external criticism transform a subculture into a self-protective system, whereas reasoned disagreement, learning from mistakes and protection of professional independence can improve the cultural quality of the legal system as a whole [**7**; **9**].

When speaking of a national legal culture, historical continuity should not be equated with immutability. Armenian legal experience developed through the interaction of customary, ecclesiastical and secular law and external legal influences, which itself demonstrates that legal identity can be preserved under conditions of borrowing and reinterpretation. Accordingly, the scholarly way to protect national specificity is not isolation from external influences, but their meaningful localization through one's own constitutional values, language, legal concepts and institutional experience [**1**; **19**].

A systemic study requires legal culture to be viewed as an open system. It interacts with political, moral, economic, religious and informational cultures. The autonomy of legal culture does not imply isolation; it is conditioned by the specific language of law, formalized procedures, legal consequences and the organized possibility of coercion. Moral evaluation affects the acceptance of a legal requirement, whereas legal culture also includes knowledge of competence, procedure and responsibility [**9**].

The study of legal culture cannot be reduced to listing its elements. What is decisive is the nature of the connections among them, the contradictions they contain and the paths of their transformation. A high level of culture is not simply the sum of high scores across separate elements; it is the coherence of values, norms, institutions and behaviour. Where values proclaimed by the Constitution are not reflected in everyday administrative or judicial practice, a cultural gap emerges and gradually weakens the persuasive force of law.

The relationship between culture and legal civilization is of fundamental importance in the theory of legal culture. Legal civilization emphasizes historically formed large-scale systems of legal development and their institutional and ideological types, whereas legal culture makes it possible to study both that broad system and the group and individual differences existing within it. Belonging to the same legal family does not by itself imply an identical level of legal culture or identical law-enforcement practices [**3**; **19**].

One objection sometimes raised against an axiological understanding of culture is that value-based assessment deprives the researcher of neutrality. This objection is partly justified where evaluative criteria are concealed or arbitrary. In jurisprudence, however, complete value neutrality is impossible, because law itself enshrines standards of dignity, equality, freedom and legal security. The scholarly requirement is therefore not to abandon value judgment, but to disclose its normative basis and apply it consistently [**17**; **18**]

Legal culture is distinct from legal ideology. Ideology is a systematized set of ideas concerning law, the state and social order, whereas culture also includes the materialization and practical implementation of those ideas. The proclamation of high values in official documents may coexist with administrative practices that contradict them. In such a case, the mismatch between ideological and practical layers becomes an indicator of a cultural gap.

Legal tradition is an important, but not immutable, element of legal culture. A. Vagharshyan's study of the legal systems of Armenia and the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia shows that Armenian legal experience was formed through a combination of legal custom, ecclesiastical rules, law codes and external legal influences. This historical multilayeredness makes it possible to view national legal culture not as a closed heritage, but as a capacity to interact while preserving identity [**1**].

The spatial boundaries of legal culture are also relative. Within a single state there may exist urban and rural, central and local, digital and non-digital, professional and everyday legal subcultures. Their differences concern levels of knowledge, habits of resorting to legal institutions, interpersonal trust and the acceptability of informal solutions. Nationwide averages often conceal significant inequalities in legal accessibility.

For the assessment of professional subcultures, what is decisive is not their autonomous existence but the nature of their relationship with the general legal order. Legitimate professional autonomy is a resource of legal culture when it secures professional independence, reasoned decision-making, accountability and the ability to learn from error. The problem arises when unwritten internal rules prevail in practice over legal principles, external criticism is perceived as a group threat, and

disclosure of error is treated as a breach of solidarity. In such circumstances, a subculture ceases to be a mechanism for maintaining professional quality and becomes a closed system of self-protection. This distinction makes it possible to assess professional culture through the criteria of openness, reason-giving, responsibility and self-corrective capacity.

A systemic definition of legal culture makes it possible to formulate a criterion of internal integrity. A system is integral when value declarations, legal norms, organizational rules and actual conduct do not contradict one another, or when effective mechanisms exist to identify and correct existing contradictions. Integrity does not mean the absence of contradictions; it means an institutional capacity for self-criticism and correction.

Developing L. Friedman's sociological approach, it is useful to distinguish the external and internal layers of legal culture. The external layer concerns citizens' expectations, trust and behavioural orientations toward law and legal institutions, while the internal layer concerns the professional attitudes and practices of lawyers and public officials. The relationship between them is bidirectional: poor professional practice can reduce public trust, while a stable change in public expectations can gradually transform institutional practice. Legal culture therefore cannot be located entirely either within public opinion or within the professional environment; it is formed in the field of their mutual influence [**11**].

The anthropological perspective is particularly valuable because it reveals the complete experience of encountering law - from entering an institution to understanding a decision, assessing its reasoning and having a genuine possibility to challenge it. Every link in this chain may communicate meanings of equality, respect, subordination or alienation. A one-time inconvenience is not yet a cultural characteristic, but the stable repetition of the same practice and its reproduction by subsequent generations or professional groups makes it an object of legal-cultural study. Thus, the anthropological approach is important for theoretical and legal analysis not because it describes external forms, but because it reveals how those forms become stable factors shaping the perception of legal status and subsequent behaviour [**14**].

The appropriate unit of comparative analysis should be not society as a whole treated as a single hierarchical entity, but a specific legal function. Comparable phenomena may include, for example, access to judicial protection, the reasoned character of decisions, contractual predictability, the genuine possibility of public participation, or professional independence. Such functional comparison reveals both strengths and weaknesses without placing societies on a simplified scale of "high" and "low" legal cultures. It also prevents the methodological error of generalizing a success in one field to the entire legal culture, or drawing broad civilizational conclusions from a single deficiency [**15**].

Cultural relativity cannot justify violations of fundamental human rights. National specificity may be taken into account when choosing the form in which a legal standard is implemented, but not by denying human dignity or the prohibition of discrimination. This distinction allows universal rights and local legal meanings to be combined without absolutizing either of them [**6**; **17**; **18**].

For the delimitation of the concept of legal culture, four interrelated criteria are proposed. First, the phenomenon must have direct legal relevance and be connected with the creation, perception, implementation or protection of law. Second, it must possess a certain degree of stability and reproducibility, because accidental or one-time conduct does not yet constitute culture. Third, it must be open to explicit value-based assessment according to the criteria of dignity, freedom, equality, justice, legal certainty and responsibility. Fourth, the phenomenon must be capable of influencing legal behaviour or institutional practice. It is the combination of these four criteria that distinguishes legal culture both from a mere description of the legal system and from a narrow understanding of individual legal consciousness. [**9**; **15**]

Self-corrective capacity may be regarded as a procedural criterion of the maturity of legal culture. It is expressed not in the absence of errors, but in effective means of identifying them, making them visible, discussing their causes and revising their legal consequences. Judicial appeal, constitutional review, the requirement to give reasons for decisions, professional criticism, disciplinary liability, public oversight and institutional learning from previous mistakes are different manifestations of the same phenomenon. In this sense, a developed legal culture is not an "error-free" system, but one capable of making its own deviations visible and correcting them through lawful procedures [**10**; **16**; **21**].

From this perspective, the independent scientific value of legal culture lies in its capacity to answer three questions: what meaning law acquires for its addressee; through what stable modes legal values are materialized in institutional activity; and how those modes are reproduced or transformed over time. These questions make it possible to distinguish legal culture from the legal system, legal ideology and legal consciousness while preserving their interconnections [**5**; **9**; **11**; **15**].

On this basis, the concept of a "cultural gap" may be differentiated according to the location of the gap. An axiological-normative gap exists where a proclaimed constitutional value is not properly transformed into a rule of legal regulation. A normative-organizational gap arises where a legal rule formally exists, but the procedures, clear allocation of competences or organizational conditions necessary for its implementation are lacking. A practical gap occurs where the norm and organizational structure exist but actual administrative or judicial practice departs from them. A communicative gap exists where a decision may be formally lawful but remains incomprehensible, insufficiently reasoned or practically inaccessible to its addressee. This differentiation turns the "cultural gap" into a diagnostic tool, because each type of gap requires a different form of legal intervention [**11**].

The success of legal reform largely depends on the cultural resources on which a new norm relies. A normative amendment can quickly change the legal text, but it cannot transform professional habits, public expectations and organizational roles at the same pace. This does not mean that culture is an immutable obstacle to reform; on the contrary, legal change is itself a cultural impulse. The scholarly task is to design reform in a way that takes existing behavioural preconditions into account, creates procedures for reproducing new practices and ensures a transitional link between old and new standards [**11**; **15**].

Under conditions of legal pluralism, state law is not the sole source of legal meanings. Professional self-regulation, contractual usages, community norms and international standards influence legal behaviour in different fields. A systemic study of legal culture cannot ignore them, but neither should it equate them with state law. The research task is to determine the relationship of non-state normative orders to constitutional values, state coercion and formal mechanisms for the protection of rights. This delimitation makes it possible to describe legal diversity without dissolving the institutional specificity of law [**9**; **19**].

The study of symbols and rituals is relevant to legal culture only when connected to legal consequences. Judicial attire, the organization of courtroom space or the design of an official document do not possess legal value in themselves. They acquire cultural significance when they affect perceptions of equality between the parties, distance from authority, the experience of being heard or the authority of a decision. The anthropological perspective should therefore not be reduced to a description of external forms; it must reveal the causal pathway through which form alters the perception of legal status and subsequent behaviour [**13**; **14**].

For empirical research into legal culture, overvaluing a single indicator is particularly dangerous. A high level of knowledge of law does not prove trust; a high level of trust does not prove equal application; and a generally positive attitude toward public authorities does not prove effective judicial protection. The multidimensional nature of the concept requires the combination of different data sources and a causal hypothesis formulated in advance. Otherwise, the expression "level of legal culture" becomes an indeterminate general assessment that merges different phenomena into a single figure [**15**; **20**; **22**].

Accordingly, the principal scientific result of the theory of legal culture should not be the formulation of yet another all-encompassing definition, but the development of rules for research. First, the existence of a legal phenomenon must be distinguished from its cultural quality. Second, descriptive fact must be separated from the evaluative criterion, so that what is widespread is not equated with what is lawful, and what is accepted with what is developed. Third, societal, group and individual levels must be studied as interconnected but not interchangeable. Fourth, the integrity of legal culture should be assessed through the relationship among values, norms, institutions and actual behaviour, as well as through the capacity to identify and correct gaps. Taken together, these rules give the concept of "legal culture" an independent object of theoretical and legal analysis and a set of applicable criteria [**9**; **15**; **10**].

The proposed definition therefore has not only nominative but also research significance. Legal culture may be understood as the axiological-normative, cognitive, institutional and practical quality of the legal life of society, a social group and the individual, expressed in stable modes of creating, perceiving, justifying, implementing, protecting and transmitting law. The word "quality" prevents the concept from absorbing legal reality in its entirety; the reference to "stable modes" distinguishes culture from accidental conduct; and the multilevel structure combines its objectified and subjective forms [**2**; **8**; **11**].

For the empirical assessment of legal culture, at least four complementary dimensions should be used. The first is normative quality: the comprehensibility, certainty and internal coherence of legal language. The second is institutional implementation: equal treatment, reasoned decisions and the proper exercise of competences. The third is legal accessibility: the genuine possibility for a person to participate, to be heard, to obtain legal assistance and to make use of remedies. The fourth is self-corrective capacity: effective mechanisms for reviewing errors, ensuring responsibility, enabling

public criticism and supporting institutional learning. None of these dimensions can by itself represent the "level" of legal culture. A scientific assessment must show how they are interrelated and, in particular, identify the points at which a high normative score fails to produce a corresponding result in legal practice [**10**; **11**; **20**].

Conclusion

The analysis conducted makes it possible to formulate the following principal conclusions.

First of all, legal culture is a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses value-normative orientations, cognitive structures, institutional mechanisms, and behavioral practices. It serves as a qualitative characteristic of the legal existence of a subject (whether a society, a group, or an individual), manifesting in stable patterns of law-making, interpretation, implementation, and the transmission of legal experience.

Second, a fundamental methodological tool for defining the boundaries of legal culture is the criterion of "cultural relevance". This criterion allows an element of a legal system to be classified as "cultural" only if it reflects a persistent, recurring practice that is subject to axiological evaluation. Such a concept makes it possible to filter out marginal or incidental phenomena, while avoiding an unjustified narrowing of the term "culture" to a mere collection of personal beliefs or subjective notions.

In closing, the analysis of legal culture requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses the quality of legislation, law enforcement practice, the accessibility of justice, and the self-regulatory mechanisms of the legal system. It is necessary to consider these components both in their autonomy and in their systemic unity. In our view, future research should focus on the development of measurable indicators for each of these areas. This will make it possible to move from evaluative judgments about the "level of legal culture" to an objective analysis based on verified data.

Bibliography

1. **Վաղարշյան Ա.,** Հայաստանի և Կիլիկյան հայկական թագավորության իրավական համակարգերը և իրավունքի աղբյուրները» // Բանբեր Երևանի համալսարանի. Իրավագիտություն, 2016 թ., հ. 7, թիվ 1 (19), էջ 3–12:
2. **Баумова М.Г.** Функции правовой культуры: диссертация ... кандидата юридических наук. – Ярославль, 2005. – 220 с.
3. Давид Р., Жоффре-Спинози К. Основные правовые системы современного мира / Пер. с фр. В. А. Туманова. – М., Международные отношения, 2003. – 400 с.
4. **Нерсесянц В. С.** Общая теория права и государства – Москва, Норма, 2004. – 832 с.
5. **Семитко А. П.** Развитие правовой культуры как правовой прогресс: Проблемы теории и методологии. Дис. … док. юрид. наук. – Екатеренбург. 1996. – 288 с.
6. **Смоленский М.Б.** Правовая культура, личность и гражданское общество в России: формула взаимообусловленности // Правоведение. 2003, № 1. С. 197-204
7. **Соколов Н. Я.** Профессиональное правосознание юристов. – М., Наука. 1988. – 224 с.
8. **Шашин П. А.** Правовая культура в правовой системе общества. Дис. … канд. юрид. наук. – Санкт-Петербург. 2006. – 191 с.
9. **Cotterrell R.** Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory. London. Ashgate, 2006. – 206 p.
10. European Commission For Democracy Through Law. (Venice Commission). Rule Of Law Checklist. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016). – 52 p, URL: https://share.google/63VTta1cC7CTUsQIy (Accessed at 01.09.2026)
11. **Friedman L. M.** The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975. – 33 8 p.
12. **Fuller L. L**., The Morality of Law. Revised edition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963. – 262 p.
13. **Hart H. L. A.** The Concept of Law. 2nd Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford.1994. – 332 p.
14. **Merry S**. What Is Legal Culture - An Anthropological Perspective. // Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, p. 40-58.
15. **Nelken D.** Using the Concept of Legal Culture // Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2004, Vol. 29, p.1-26, URL: https://summerland.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/ AUJlLegPhil /2004/11.html (Accessed at 01.09.2026)
16. **Tamanaha B. Z**. On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. – 180 p.
17. The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia (adopted on 05. 1995, with amendments approved on 06. 2015) URL: https://u.to/h97EIg (The link is shortened. Accessed at 22.08.2026).
18. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (adapted on 04.11.1950, amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14) https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG (Accessed at 22.08.2026).
19. **Twining W. L.** General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. – 517 p.
20. **Tyler T. R.** Why People Obey the Law, 2nd edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. – 320 p.
21. **Waldron J.** The Concept and the Rule of Law // Georgia Law Review, 2008, Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 1–61.

Сдана / Հանձնվել է՝ 09.10.2026
Рецензирована / Գրախոսվել է՝ 14.10.2026
Принята / Ընդունվել է՝ 19.10.2026